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Identity-Based Secure Distributed Data Storage
Schemes
Jinguang Han, Student Member, IEEE, Willy Susilo, Senior Member, IEEE,
and Yi Mu, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Secure distributed data storage can shift the burden of maintaining a large number of ﬁles from the owner to proxy servers.
Proxy servers can convert encrypted ﬁles for the owner to encrypted ﬁles for the receiver without the necessity of knowing the content
of the original ﬁles. In practice, the original ﬁles will be removed by the owner for the sake of space efﬁciency. Hence, the issues on
conﬁdentiality and integrity of the outsourced data must be addressed carefully. In this paper, we propose two identity-based secure
distributed data storage (IBSDDS) schemes. Our schemes can capture the following properties: (1) The ﬁle owner can decide the
access permission independently without the help of the private key generator (PKG); (2) For one query, a receiver can only access
one ﬁle, instead of all ﬁles of the owner; (3) Our schemes are secure against the collusion attacks, namely even if the receiver can
compromise the proxy servers, he cannot obtain the owner’s secret key. Although the ﬁrst scheme is only secure against the chosen
plaintext attacks (CPA), the second scheme is secure against the chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA). To the best of our knowledge, it is
the ﬁrst IBSDDS schemes where an access permissions is made by the owner for an exact ﬁle and collusion attacks can be protected
in the standard model.
Index Terms—Distributed Data Storage, Identity-based System, Access Control, Security
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I NTRODUCTION

C

LOUD computing provides users with a convenient
mechanism to manage their personal ﬁles with the
notion called database-as-a-service (DAS) [1], [2], [3]. In
DAS schemes, a user can outsource his encrypted ﬁles
to untrusted proxy servers. Proxy servers can perform
some functions on the outsourced ciphertexts without
knowing anything about the original ﬁles. Unfortunately,
this technique has not been employed extensively. The
main reason lies in that users are especially concerned on
the conﬁdentiality, integrity and query of the outsourced
ﬁles as cloud computing is a lot more complicated than
the local data storage systems, as the cloud is managed
by an untrusted third party. After outsorcing the ﬁles to
proxy servers, the user will remove them from his local
machine. Therefore, how to guarantee the outsoured ﬁles
are not accessed by the unauthorized users and not modiﬁed by proxy servers is an important problem that has
been considered in the data storage research community.
Furthermore, how to guarantee that an authorized user
can query the outsourced ﬁles from proxy servers is
another concern as the proxy server only maintains the
outsourced ciphertexts. Consequently, research around
these topics grows signiﬁcantly.
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Conﬁdentiality is proposed to prevent unauthorized
users from accessing the sensitive data as it is subject to
unauthorized disclose and access after being outsourced.
Since the introduction of DAS, the conﬁdentiality of
outsourced data has been the primary focus among the
research community. To provide conﬁdentiality to the
outsourced data, encryption schemes are deployed [4],
[5], [6], [7], [8].
Integrity can prevent outsourced data from being replaced and modiﬁed. Some schemes have been proposed
to protect the integrity of the outsourced data, such as
proof of retrievability [9], [10], [11], [12], [13] and provable data possession [14], [15], [16]. In these schemes,
digital signature schemes and message authentication
codes (MAC) are deployed.
Query in data storage is executed between a receiver
and a proxy server. The proxy server can perform some
functions on the outsourced ciphertexts and convert
them to those for the receiver. As a result, the receiver
can obtain the data outsourced by the owner without the
proxy server knowing the content of the data [17], [18],
[19], [20].
1.1

Related Work

In this section, we review schemes related to identitybased secure distributed data storage (IBSDDS) schemes.
1.1.1 Data Storage Systems
Data storage systems enable users to store their data
to external proxy servers to enhance the access and
availability, and reduce the maintainance cost. Samarati
and Vimercati [21] addressed the privacy issues in data
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outsourcing expanding from the data conﬁdentiality to
data utility, and pointed out the main research directions
in the protection of the externally stored data. Kher
and Kim [22] surveyed the data storage systems comprehensively and classiﬁed them into three kinds based
on their security services: networked ﬁle systems (NFS),
storage-based intrusion detection systems (SBIDS) and
cryptographic ﬁle systems (CFS).
Networked File Systems. In these systems, proxy servers
are assumed to be trusted. They authenticate receivers
and validate access permissions. The interactions between the proxy servers and receivers are executed in a
secure channel. Therefore, these systems cannot provide
an end-to-end data security, namely they cannot ensure
the conﬁdentiality of the data stored at the proxy server
[23], [24], [25]. In these schemes, a receiver authenticates
himself to the proxy server using his password. Then,
the proxy sever passes the authentication result to the
ﬁle owner. The owner will make an access permission
according to the received information.
Storage-based Intrusion Detection Systems. In these systems, an intrusion detection scheme is embedded in
proxy servers or the ﬁle owner to detect the intruder’s
behaviors, such as adding backdoors, inserting Trojan
horses and tampering with audit logs. These schemes
can be classiﬁed into two types: host-based system and
network-based system. In the host-based systems, an
intrusion detection scheme is embedded in the host to
detect the local intrusion actions [26]. On the contrary,
in network-based systems, an intrusion detection scheme
is embedded in the proxy servers to detect the external
intruder’s actions. The main advantage of these systems
is that proxy servers can still detect the intrusion actions
even if the host is compromised as the proxy server are
independent from the host [27], [28], [29].

semi-trusted proxy server can transfer a ciphertext for
the original decryptor to a ciphertext for the designated
decryptor without knowing the plaintext. Proxy cryptosystem as an efﬁcient primitive has been used in email
forwarding, law enforcement and data storage. Identitybased cryptosystem introduced by Shamir [36] is a system where the public key can be any arbitrary string
and the secret key is issued by a trusted party called the
private key generator (PKG). Being different from public
key infrastructure (PKI), two parties can communicate
directly without verifying their public key certiﬁcates
in identity-based systems. The ﬁrst secure and practical
identity-base encryption (IBE) was proposed by Boneh
and Franklin [37] based on pairing.
Identity-based proxy encryption (IBPE) was ﬁrst proposed by Ivan and Dodis [4] where the formal deﬁnitions
and security models for both unidirectional and bidirectional IBPE schemes were formalized. In their schemes,
the master secret key which is used to extract secret
keys for users is split into two parts. One is sent to
the proxy server and the other is sent to the user. The
user can decrypt a ciphertext for him with the help
of the proxy server. Consequently, Ateniese, Fu, Green
and Hohenberger [5] pointed out that these schemes
are not secure against the collusion attacks, namely
the master secret key can be exposed if the user can
compromise the proxy server. The ﬁrst identity-based
proxy re-encryption (IBPRE) was proposed by Green
and Ateniese [38] where the proxy sever can transfer a
ciphertext for the original decryptor to a ciphertext for
the designated decryptor after he gets a re-encryption
key from the former. We divide the IBPRE schemes into
the following two types based on the generation of the
re-encryption key:

1.1.2 Identity-based Proxy Re-encryption

The re-encryption key can be computed by the original
decryptor [38], [39], [40]. In these schemes, for a decryption request, the original decryptor selects a random
number and computes a re-encryption key by randomizing his secret key. Then, he encrypts the selected random
number under the receiver’s identity. Finally, he sends
the re-encryption key and the ciphertext to the proxy
server. Using the re-encryption key, the proxy server
can transfer a ciphertext for the original decryptor to
a ciphertext for the designated decryptor. The designated decryptor decrypts the ciphertext using his secret
key and obtains the random number selected by the
original decrptor. Then, he can decrypt the re-encrypted
ciphertext by the random number. Unfortunately, these
schemes are vulnerable to the collusion attacks. If the
designated decryptor can compromise the proxy server,
they can decrypt the ciphertext, obtain the random number selected by the original decryptor and compute the
secret key of the original decryptor.

Proxy cryptosystem was introduced by Mambo and
Okamoto [34] to delegate the decryption power to a
designated decryptor. Then, Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss
[35] proposed an atomic proxy cryptosystem where a

The re-encryption key must be computed by the PKG [41],
[42], [43]. In these schemes, the PKG computes the reencryption key by checking the secret keys of the original
decryptor and the designated decryptor.

Cryptographic File System. In these systems, an endto-end security is provided by cryptographic protocols
which are executed by the ﬁle owner to prevent proxy
servers and unauthorized users from modifying and
accessing the sensitive ﬁles. These systems can be divided into two types: shared ﬁle system and non-shared
system. In shared ﬁle systems [30], [31], the owner can
share his ﬁles with a group of users. Cryptographic
techniques deployed in these systems are key sharing,
key agreement and key revocation. In non-shared ﬁle
systems [32], [33], in order to share a ﬁle with another
user, the owner can compute an access key for the user
using his secret key. In these two systems, the integrity
of the sensitive ﬁles is provided by digital signature
schemes and message authentication codes (MAC).
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1.1.3 Identity-based Secure Distributed Data Storage
In an identity-based secure distributed data storage (IBSDDS) scheme, a user’s identity can be an arbitrary
string and two parties can communicate with each other
without checking the public key certiﬁcates. At ﬁrst, the
ﬁle owner encrypts his ﬁles under his identity prior to
outsourcing them to proxy servers. Then, he sends the
ciphertexts to the proxy servers. Consequently, the proxy
servers can transfer a ciphertext encrypted under the
identity of the owner to a ciphertext encrypted under
the identity of the receiver after they has obtained an
access permission (re-encryption key) from the owner.
To provide conﬁdentiality for the outsouced data, an
efﬁcient IBSDDS scheme should provide the following
properties.
1) Unidirectional. After receiving an access permission,
the proxy server can transfer a ciphertext for Alice
to a ciphertext for Bob while he cannot transfer a
ciphertext for Bob to a ciphertext for Alice.
2) Non-interactive. The access permission can be created by the ﬁle owner without any trusted third
party and interaction with him.
3) Key optimal. The size of the secret key of the receiver
is constant and independent of the delegations
which he accepts.
4) Collusion-safe. The secret key of the ﬁle owner is
secure even if the receiver can compromise the
proxy server.
5) Non-transitive. Receiving the access permissions
computed by Alice for Bob and Bob for Charlie,
the proxy server cannot transfer a ciphertext for
Alice to a ciphertext for Charlie.
6) File-based access. For one query, the receiver can only
access one ﬁle. This can improve the security of the
outsourced ﬁles and is desirable to maintain the
access record.
Here, 1)-5) are from [5]. Proxy invisibility discussed in [5]
is difﬁcult to achieve as the length of the re-encrypted
ciphertext is subject to be different from that of the original ciphertext. Furthermore, original-access mentioned in
[5] cannot be guaranteed as the key escrow problem,
namely the secret key is created by the PKG, instead of
the user. Hence, the ﬁle owner in an IBSDSS scheme has
less control on his secret key than that in other public
key encryption schemes.
Although IBPRE holds partial properties of IBSDDS,
it cannot been used in IBSDDS systems directly. For
example, in the current IBPRE schemes, the receiver and
the proxy servers can cooperate to access all the ﬁles
outsourced by the owner as the access permission (reencryption key) is only bound to the identity of the
receiver and independent of the ﬁle. This is undesirable
for the ﬁle owner to record the accessed number of his
ﬁles. Furthermore, they are interactive [41], [42], [43] or
not collusion safe [38], [39], [40].

Since the PKG can generate a secret key for each user,
he can decrypt the ciphertexts and obtain the original
ﬁles if he knows the identity used to encrypt the ﬁles.
Therefore, in this paper, we assume that the PKG is
honest and can be trusted by all users in the systems.
1.2

Our Contribution

In this paper, we propose two identity-based secure
distributed data storage (IBSDDS) schemes in standard
model where, for one query, the receiver can only access one of the owner’s ﬁles, instead of all ﬁles. In
other words, an access permission (re-encryption key)
is bound not only to the identity of the receiver but also
the ﬁle. The access permission can be decided by the
owner, instead of the trusted party (PKG). Furthermore,
our schemes are secure against the collusion attacks.
Although the ﬁrst scheme is CPA secure, the second
scheme achieves CCA security. To the best of our knowledge, it is the ﬁrst IBSDDS schemes where an access
permission is made by the owner for an exact ﬁle and
collusion attacks can be protected in the standard model.
To achieve a stronger security and to implement ﬁlebased access control, the owner must be online to authenticate requesters and also to generate access permissions for them. Therefore, the owner in our schemes
needs do more computations than that in PRE schemes.
Although PRE schemes can provide the similar functionalities of our schemes when the owner only has one ﬁle,
these are not ﬂexible and practical.
1.3

Paper Organization

We review the preliminaries used throughout the paper
in Section 2. In Section 3, we propose a CPA secure
IBSDDS scheme and analyze its security. A CCA secure
IBSDDS scheme is proposed and proven in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes the paper.

2

P RELIMINARIES
R

In the remainder of this paper, we denote a ← A as a is
R
chosen from A at random. Especially, we denote a ← A
as a is chosen uniformly from A if A is a ﬁnite set. For
n ∈ N, we denote [n] as the integers {1, 2, · · · , n}. By
A(x) → y, we denote that y is computed by running the
algorithm A on input x. We say that a function  : Z → R
is negligible if, for all k ∈ Z, there exists a z ∈ Z such
that (x) ≤ x1k when x > z.
2.1 Identity-based Secure Distributed Data Storage
(IBSDDS)
There are four entities in an identity-based secure distributed data storage (IBSDDS) scheme: the private key
generator (PKG), the data owner, the proxy server and
the receiver. The PKG validates the users’ identities and
issues secret keys to them. The data owner encrypts his
data and outsources the ciphertexts to the proxy servers.
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Proxy servers store the encrypted data and transfer the
ciphertext for the owner to the ciphertext for the receiver
when they obtains an access permission (re-encryption
key) from the owner. The receiver authenticates himself
to the owner and decrypts the re-encrypted ciphertext
to obtain the data. An IBSDDS scheme consists of the
following algorithms:
Setup(1 ) → (params, M SK). The setup algorithm takes
as input a security parameter 1 , and outputs the public
parameters params and a master secret M SK.
KeyGen(params, ID, M SK) → SKID . The key generation algorithm takes as input the public parameters
params, an identity ID and the master secret key M SK,
and outputs a secret key SKID for the identity ID.
Encryption(params, ID, Mi ) → CTi . Suppose that there
are k messages {M1 , M2 , · · · , Mk }. To encrypt the message Mi , the encryption algorithm takes as input the
public parameters params, the identity ID and the message Mi , and outputs the ciphertext CTi = (Ci,1 , Ci,2 ),
for i = 1, 2, · · · , k. It sends the ciphertexts CTi to the
proxy servers.
Query(ID , SKID , CTi ) → AI. The query algorithm
takes as input the receiver’s identity ID , the receiver’s secrete key SKID and the ciphertext CTi ,
and outputs an authentication information AI. It sends
(ID , AI, CTi ) to the proxy server. The proxy server
redirects (ID , AI, Ci,2 ) to the owner with identity ID.


Permission(params, ID , Ci,2 , SKID ) → RKID→ID The
permission algorithm checks the authentication information AI. If the receiver is legal, this algorithm takes as
inputs the public parameters params, the receiver’s identity ID and the owner’s secret key SKID , and outputs
an access permission (re-encryption key) RKID→ID . It
sends RKID→ID to the proxy server.
Re-encryption(params, ID , RKID→ID , CTi ) → (CTi ).
The re-encryption algorithm takes as input the public
parameters params, the receiver’s identity ID , the access permission RKID→ID and the ciphertext CTi , and
outputs a ciphertext CTi = Encryption(params, ID , Mi )
for the receiver with identity ID .
Decryption. There are two algorithms. One is for the
owner and the other is for the receiver.
1) Decryption1 (params, SKID , CTi ) → Mi . The owner
decryption algorithm takes as input the public
parameters params, the owner’s secret key SKID
and the ciphertext CTi , and outputs the message
Mi .
2) Decryption2 (params, SKID , CTi ) → Mi . The receiver decryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters params, the receiver’s secret key
SKID and the re-encrypted ciphertext CTi , and
outputs the message Mi .

Deﬁnition 1. We say an identity-based secure distributed
data storage (IBSDDS) scheme is correct if
⎤
⎡
Setup(1 ) → (params,
⎥
⎢ Decryption1 (
M SK);
⎥
⎢
⎥
⎢ params, SKID , KeyGen(params, ID,
⎥=1
⎢
Pr ⎢
⎥
CT
)
→
M
M
SK)
→
SK
;
i
i
ID
⎥
⎢
⎣
Encryption(params, ID, ⎦
Mi ) → CTi
and
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢ Decryption2 (
⎢
⎢ params, SKID ,
⎢

Pr ⎢
⎢ CTi ) → Mi
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣

Setup(1 ) → (params,
M SK);
KeyGen(params, ID,
M SK) → SKID ;
KeyGen(params, ID ,
M SK) → SKID ;
Permission(params, ID ,
Ci,2 , SKID ) → RKID→ID ;
Re-encryption(params,
ID , RKID→ID , CTi )
→ CTi

⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥=1
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦

where the probability is taken over the random coins which all
the algorithms in the scheme consumes.
2.2

Security Model

We formalize the security model of the IBSDDS scheme
by the following game. This game is run between a
challenger and an adversary as follows:
Setup. The challenger runs Setup(1 ) to generate the
public parameters params and a master secret key
M SK, and sends params to the adversary A.
Phase 1. The adversary A can adaptively make the
following queries:
1) Secret Key Query. The adversary A can query
secret key for an identity ID. The challenger runs
KeyGen (params, ID, M SK) to generate a secret
key SKID . The challenger responds A with SKID .
2) Permission Query. The adversary A can query
a permission on (ID, ID , Ci,2 ). The challenger
runs KeyGen(params, ID, M SK) to extract the secret key SKID and Permission( params, ID , Ci,2 ,
SKID ) to obtain RKID→ID . The challenger responds A with RKID→ID .
3) Re-encryption Query. The adversary A can
query re-encryption on (ID, ID , CTi ). The
challenger
runs
KeyGen(params, ID, M SK)
to generate a secret key SKID , and runs
Permission(params, ID , Ci,2 , SKID ) to obtain
RKID→ID . The challenger responds A with
Re-encryption (params, ID , RKID→ID , CTi ).
4) Owner Decryption Query. The adversary A can
query owner decryption on (ID, CTi ). The challenger runs KeyGen(params, ID, M SK) to extract
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the secret key SKID . The challenger responds A
with Decryption1 (params, SKID , CTi ).
5) Receiver Decryption Query. The adversary A
can query receiver decryption on (ID, ID , CTi ).
The challenger runs KeyGen(params, ID, M SK)
and KeyGen(params, ID , M SK) to extract

the secret keys SKID and SKID
, Permission

(params, ID , Ci,2 , SKID ) to obtain RKID→ID
and Re-encryption(params, ID , RKID→ID , CTi )
to get CTi . The challenger responds A with

Decryption2 (params, SKID
, CTi ).
Challenge. The adversary A submits an identity ID∗
and two messages M0 and M1 with equal length.
The challenger ﬂips an unbiased coin with {0, 1} and
obtains b ∈ {0, 1}. The challenger computes C ∗ =
Encryption(parmas, ID∗ , Mb ) and sends C ∗ to A.
Phase 2. The adversary can adaptively make queries as
in Phase 1 with the following restricts:
1) Secret key Query. The adversary A cannot query
KeyGen(params, ID∗ , M SK).
2) Permission Query. The adversary A cannot
query
Permission(ID∗ , ID, C2∗ )
and
KeyGen
(params, ID, M SK).
3) Re-encryption Query. The adversary A cannot query re-encryption on (ID∗ , ID, CT ∗ ),
Permission(ID∗ , ID, C2∗ ) and KeyGen(params, ID,
M SK).
4) Owner Decryption Query. The adversary A cannot
query owner decryption on (ID∗ , CT ∗ ).
5) Receiver Decryption Query. The adversary A cannot query re-encryption on (ID∗ , ID, CT ∗ ) and
˜ ∗ ), where CT
˜ ∗ is the
receiver decryption on (ID, CT
re-encrypted ciphertext of CT ∗ .
Guess. The adversary A outputs his guess b on b. A
wins the game if b = b.
Deﬁnition 2. An identity-based secure distributed data storage (IBSDDS) scheme is (T, q1 , q2 , q3 , q4 , q5 , ())-secure
against chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA) if no probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary A making at most q1 secret key
queries, q2 permission queries, q3 re-encryption queries, q4
owner decryption queries and q5 receiver decryption queries
can win the game with the advantage
CCA = | Pr[b = b] − 1 | ≥ ()
AdvA
2
in the above model.
Deﬁnition 3. An identity-based distributed data storage
(IBDDS) scheme is (T, q1 , q2 , q3 , ())-secure against chosen
plaintext attacks (CPA) if no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A making at most q1 secret key queries, q2 permission
queries and q3 re-encryption queries can win the game with
the advantage
CPA = | Pr[b = b] − 1 | ≥ ()
AdvA
2

in the above model.
Theorem 1. An identity-based secure distributed data storage
(IBSDDS) scheme is unidirectional, nontransitive and collusion safe if it is secure against the chosen plaintext attacks
(CPA) in the above model.
Proof: Our proof is similar to that in [42]. In the CPA
security model, the adversary A can query secret key
oracle, permission oracle and re-encryption oracle.
Collusion-safe. If the scheme is not collusion safe, there
exists an algorithm B that can use A to break the
CPA security in the above security model. A can query
secret key SKID for an identity ID and permission
RKID→ID from an identity ID to ID . After receiving
the challenged ciphertext CT ∗ for the identity ID, if
A can compute the secret key SKID from SKID and
RKID→ID , B can use SKID to decrypt CT ∗ . Hence, B
can use A to break the CPA security in the above model.
Nontransitive. If the scheme is transitive, there exists an
algorithm B that can use A to break the CPA security in
the above security model. A can query secret keys SKID
and SKID for identities ID and ID . Furthermore,
A can query permissions RKID→ID and RKID →ID .
After receiving the challenged ciphertext CT ∗ for the
identity ID, if A can compute the permission RKID→ID
from RKID→ID and RKID →ID , B can use RKID→ID
ˆ for the
to transfer the ciphertext CT ∗ to a ciphertext CT
ˆ .
identity ID . Then, B can use SKID to decrypt CT
So, B can use A to break the CPA security in the above
security model.
Unidirectional. If the scheme is not unidirectional in the
above model, there exists an algorithm B that can use A
to break the CPA security in the above security model.
The adversary A can query secret key SKID for an
identity ID and permission RKID →ID from an identity
ID to ID. After receiving the challenged ciphertext CT ∗
for the identity ID, if A can use RKID →ID to transfer
ˆ for identity ID . Then, B can use
CT ∗ to a ciphertext CT
ˆ . Therefore, B can use
the secret key SKID to decrypt CT
A to break the CPA security in the above model.
2.3

Complexity Assumption

Let G and Gτ be two multiple cyclic groups with prime
order p, and g be a generator of G. A bilinear map e :
G × G → Gτ is a map satisﬁes the following properties:
1) Bilinearity. For all u, v ∈ G and x, y ∈ Zp , e(ux , v y ) =
e(u, v)xy .
2) No-degeneracy. e(g, g) = 1 where 1 is the identity
of the group Gτ .
3) Computability. There exists an efﬁcient algorithm
which can compute e(u, v) for all u, v ∈ G.
We denote GG(1 ) as a bilinear group generator which
takes as input a security parameter 1 and outputs a
bilinear group (e, p, G, Gτ ) with prime order p.
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Deﬁnition 4. Decisional Bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman (DBDH)
R
Assumption [37]. Let a, b, c, z ← Zp , GG(1 ) →
(e, p, G, Gτ ), and g be a generator of G. We say
that the DBDH assumption holds in (e, p, G, Gτ ) if no
probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A can distinguish
(A, B, C, Z) = (g a , g b , g c , e(g, g)abc ) from (A, B, C, Z) =
(g a , g b , g c , e(g, g)z ) with the advantage


 Pr[A(A, B, C, e(g, g)abc )] 
DBDH

 ≥ ()
=
AdvA
− Pr[A(A, B, C, e(g, g)z )] 
where the probability is token over the random choices of
a, b, c, z and the bits consumed by A.
2.4 Waters’s Identity-based Encryption
This identity-based encryption (IBE) [44] works as follows:
Setup. This algorithm takes as input the security parameters 1 , and outputs a bilinear group GG(1 ) →
(e, p, G, Gτ ) with prime order p, where e : G × G → Gτ .
R
Let g and η be generators of the group G, u0 ← G and
R
U = (u1 , u2 , · · · , un ) where ui ← G for i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
R
It sets g1 = g α where α ← Zp . The public parameters
are (e, p, G, Gτ , g, η, u0 , g1 , U ) and the master secret key
is η α .
KeyGen. Let ID represent an identity which is an n bit
string, IDi be the ith bit of ID, and I be the set which
consists of all i with IDi = 1. This algorithm chooses
R
r ← Zp , and computes
KID,1 = η α (u0

ui )r and KID,2 = g r .

The secret key for the identity ID is SKID
(KID,1 , KID,2 ).

=

Encryption. To encrypt a message M ∈ Gτ , this algorithm
R
chooses s ← Zp and computes
ui )s .
i∈I

D ISTRIBUTED

Correctness.
We have
e(KID,2 , Ci,3 )
e(KID,1 , Ci,2 )
e(g rID , (u0 i∈I ui )si )
Mi · e(g1 , η)si
e(η α (u0 i∈I ui )rID , g si )
e(g rID , (u0 i∈I )si )
Mi · e(g1 , η)si
e(g1 , η)si · e(g rID , (u0 i∈I ui )si )
1
Mi · e(g1 , η)si ·
e(g1 , η)si
Mi ,
Ci,1 ·

=
=
=
K1




t

KID
 ,1 · Ci,5 · Ci,4
KID,1

ρt
KID
· 
· (u0
 ,1 · g
KID ,1 · Γρ

=
=

The ciphertext for the message M is CT = (C1 , C2 , C3 ).
Decryption. To decrypt the ciphertext CT = (C1 , C2 , C3 ),
this algorithm takes as input the secret key SKID =
(KID,1 , KID,2 ) and computes

KID,1

ρ
KID
· (u0
 ,1 · Γ

ρ
KID
 ,1 · Γ

=
=

e(KID,2 , C3 )
M = C1 ·
e(KID,1 , C2 )
Theorem 2. This identity-based encryption scheme is
(T, q, ())-secure agasint chosen plaintex attacks (CPA) if the
()
(T + O(()−2 ln(()−1 )λ−1 ln(λ−1 )), 32q(n+1)
)-decisional
bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman (DBDH) assumption holds on the
1
bilinear group (e, p, G, Gτ ), where λ = 8q(n+1)
[44].

S ECURE

In this section, we propose an identity-based secure distributed data storage (IBSDDS I) scheme which is secure
against chosen plaintext attacks (CPA). At ﬁrst, the ﬁle
owner encrypts his ﬁles and outsources the ciphertexts
to the proxy servers. The proxy servers validate the
outsourced ciphertexts and store them for the owner.
For one query, the receiver computes an authentication
information (AI) using his secret key and sends it to the
proxy server. The proxy server sends the identity of the
receiver, AI and the partial intended ciphertext to the
owner. Suppose that the owner can know which ﬁle the
receiver wants to access from the partial ciphertext. To
check whether the requester is a legal user in the system,
the owner validates the the received AI. If the AI is
correct, the owner computes an access permission (reencryption key) using his secret key, the partial ciphertext and the identity of the receiver, and sends it to the
proxy server. Otherwise, the access is denied. The proxy
sever transfers the intended ciphertext to a ciphertext for
the receiver using the received access permission. Finally,
the receiver can decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext by
his secret key and obtains the original ﬁle. Fig.1 explains
the model of our IBSDDS schemes.
The speciﬁc protocol of our IBSDDS I scheme is
demonstrated in Fig.2. Our scheme can be seen as an
extension of Water’s IBE [44].

=

i∈I

C1 = M · e(g1 , η)s , C2 = g s and C3 = (u0

3 I DENTITY - BASED
DATA S TORAGE I

ui )β
i∈I 

ui ) β
i∈I 

ui ) β

KID,1 · (u0
i∈I
α

=

ui )rID (u0

η (u0
i∈I

ui )β
i∈I 

and

Ci,1

=

D2 · Ci,1

=

Mi · e(g1 , η)si · e(g, (u0

ui ))βsi .
i∈I 

7

Fig. 1: The Model of Identity-Based Secure Distributed Data Storage Scheme
Q(ID) = φ0 +

Therefore

Ci,1
·

=
=

e(K1 , Ci,2 )
e(g rID , (u0 i∈I ui )si )

·
Ci,1
e(η α (u0 i∈I ui )rID (u0 i∈I  ui )β , g si )
1

Ci,1
·
e(g1 , η)si · e(g, (u0 i∈I  ui ))βsi

=

Mi ·

=

Mi

e(g1 , η)si · e(g, (u0
e(g1 , η)si · e(g, (u0

ui ))βsi
βsi
i∈I  ui ))
i∈I 

Theorem 3. Our identity-based secure distributed data storage I (IBSDDS I) scheme is (T, q1 , q2 , q3 , ())-secure against
chose plaintext attacks (CPA) if the (T  ,  ())-decisional bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman (DBDH) assumption holds in the bilinear
group (e, p, G, Gτ ) where
T  = T + O(T ) and  () =

φi
i∈I



, Ci,3
)
e(Ci,6

()
.
32(q1 + 2q2 + 2q3 )(n + 1)

Proof: Our proof is similar to that in Waters’s IBE
[44], except that we must answer the permission queries
and re-encryption queries.
Suppose that there exists an adversary A that can
(T, q1 , q2 , q3 , ()) break the CPA security of our IBSDDS I scheme, we can construct an algorithm B that
can use A to break the DBDH assumption as follows.
The challenger generates the bilinear group GG(1 ) →
R
(e, p, G, Gτ ) and chooses a generator g ← G. It ﬂips
an unbiased coin μ with {0, 1}. If μ = 0, he sends
(A, B, C, Z) = (g a , g b , bc , e(g, g)abc ) to B. Otherwise, he
sends (A, B, C, Z) = (g a , g b , g c , e(g, g)z ) to B, where
R
z ← Zp . The algorithm B will output his guess μ on
μ.
Setup. The algorithm B sets σ = 4(q1 + 2q2 + 2q3 )
R
and chooses an integer ν ← [n]. It uniformly selects
two integrity vectors Π = {π1 , π2 , · · · , πn } and Φ =
R
R
{φ1 , φ2 , · · · , φn }, where πi ← [σ − 1] and φi ← Zp for
R
R
i = 1, 2, · · · , n. It choose π0 ← [σ − 1] and φ0 ← Zp . Then,
the algorithm B deﬁnes three functions:
P (ID) = (p − σν) + π0 +

πi ,
i∈I

and
R(ID) =

0,

if π0 +

i∈I

πi ≡ 0 (mod σ)

1,

if π0 +

i∈I

πi ≡ 0 (mod σ)

= A, η = B, g = g θ , g2 = Aθ , u0 =
R
g and ui = η πi g φi , where θ ← Zp . It chooses
η
R
h ← G. The public parameters are (e, p, G, Gτ , g, h, η, g, h,
u0 , g1 , g2 , U). The master secret key is η a = g ab . The
distribution of these parameters is identical to those in
the real protocol.
B sets g1
p−σν+π0 φ0

Phase 1.
1) Secret Key Query. The adversary A can query
?
secret key for an identity ID. B checks R(ID) = 1.
R

a) If R(ID) = 1, B chooses r ← Zp and computes
KID,1 = A

−Q(ID)
P (ID)

πi ) r ,

(π0

(1)

i∈I
−1

KID,2 = A P (ID) g r

(2)

θ
KID,3 = KID,2
.

(3)

and

B
responds
with
(KID,1 , KID,2 , KID,3 ).

SKID

=

b) If R(ID) = 0, B aborts and outputs his guess
μ randomly.
We claim that the secret key is generated correctly.
KID,1

=

A

−Q(ID)
P (ID)

ui )r

(u0
i∈I

=

g

−aQ(ID)
P (ID)

(g

bP (ID)+Q(ID) r

bP (ID)+Q(ID)

)

)

−a
P (ID)

ab

g (g bP (ID)+Q(ID) )r

=

(g

=

g ab (g bP (ID)+Q(ID) )r− P (ID)

=

η a (u0

a

a

ui )r− P (ID)
i∈I

Let r̂ = r −

a
P (ID) ,

we have

KID,1 = η a (u0

ui )r̂ ,
i∈I
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Setup. This algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1 , and outputs a bilinear group GG(1 ) → (e, p, G, Gτ )
R
with prime order p, where e : G × G → Gτ . Let g, h, η, g and h be the generators of G, u0 ← G and U =
R
R
(u1 , u2 , · · · , un ) where ui ← G for i = 1, 2, · · · , n. It chooses α ← Zp and sets g1 = g α and g2 = gα . The public
parameters are (e, p, G, Gτ , g, h, η, g, h, u0 , g1 , g2 , U) and the master secret key is η α .
KeyGen. Let ID denote an identity which is an n bit string, IDi be the ith bit of ID and I be the set which
consists of all the index i with IDi = 1. This algorithm takes as input the master secret key η α and the user’s
identity ID, and computes
KID,1 = η α (u0

ui )rID , KID,2 = g rID and KID,3 = grID .
i∈I

The secret key for the user is SKID = (KID,1 , KID,2 , KID,3 ). This secret key can be veriﬁed by
?

?

e(KID,1 , g) = e(η, g1 ) · e((u0

ui ), KID,2 ) and e(KID,2 , g) = e(g, KID,3 ).
i∈I
R

Encryption. Suppose that there are k message {M1 , M2 , · · · , Mk }. To encrypt Mi , the owner O choose si ← Zp
and computes
Ci,1 = Mi · e(g1 , η)si , Ci,2 = g si and Ci,3 = (u0
u i ) si
i∈I

for i = 1, 2, · · · , k. The ciphertext for the message Mi is CTi = (Ci,1 , Ci,2 , Ci,3 ). the owner sends
{CT1 , CT2 , · · · , CTk } to the proxy servers. The proxy servers (PSs) validate the ciphertexts by checking
?

ui ), Ci,2 ) = e(Ci,3 , g)

e((u0
i∈I

for i = 1, 2, · · · , k. If the equation holds, the proxy servers store the ciphertext CTi = (Ci,1 , Ci,2 , Ci,3 ) for the
owner. Otherwise, the proxy servers reject the ciphtertext.
R


Query. If a receiver R with identity ID wants to access CTi , he chooses t ← Zp , and computes KID
 ,1 =
t
t


KID ,1 h and Γ = g . He sends (ID , KID ,1 , KID ,3 , Γ) to the proxy server. Then, the proxy server redirect

(ID , KID
 ,1 , KID  ,3 , Γ, Ci,2 ) to the owner.

Permission. The owner checks whether the receiver has been veriﬁed by the PKG by
?


e(KID
 ,1 , g) = e(η, g2 ) · e((u0

ui ), KID ,3 ) · e(h, Γ).
i∈I 

R

If it holds, the owner chooses β, ρ ← Zp and computes
D1 =

KID,1

KID ,1 · Γρ

ui )β , D2 = e(Ci,2 , (u0

· (u0
i∈I 

ui ))β and D3 = gρ .
i∈I 

The owner sends (D1 , D2 , D3 , KID,2 ) to the proxy server.
Re-encryption. Receiving (D1 , D2 , D3 , KID,2 ) from the owner, the proxy server computes the re-encrypted
ciphterxt as






Ci,1
= D2 · Ci,1 , Ci,2
= Ci,2 , Ci,3
= Ci,3 , Ci,4
= D1 , Ci,5
= D3 and Ci,6
= KID,2 .






The proxy server responds the receiver with CTi = (Ci,1
, Ci,2
, Ci,3
, Ci,4
, Ci,5
, Ci,6
).

Decryption.
1) To decrypt the ciphertext CTi = (Ci,1 , Ci,2 , Ci,3 ), the owner O computes Mi = Ci,1 ·

e(KID,2 ,Ci,3 )
e(KID,1 ,Ci,2 ) .









t
2) To decrypt the ciphertext CTi = (Ci,1
, Ci,2
, Ci,3
, Ci,4
, Ci,5
, Ci,6
), the receiver R computes K1 = KID
 ,1 · Ci,5 ·

Ci,4 . Then, he can compute


, Ci,3
)
e(Ci,6

·
.
Mi = Ci,1

e(K1 , Ci,2 )

Fig. 2: IBSDDS I: Identity-Based Secure Distributed Data Storage I
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∗

KID,2 = A
and

−1
P (ID)

r

g =g

a
r− P (ID)

=g

C Q(ID ) = (u0 i∈I ∗ ui )c . B sends the ciphertext
CT ∗ = (C1∗ , C2∗ , C3∗ ) to A.

r̂

Phase 2. Phase 1 is repeated with the following restrictions.

θ
KID,3 = KID,2
= g θr̂ = gr̂ .

Therefore, the secret key is created correctly.
Permission Query. The adversary A can query permission on (ID, ID , C2 ). B checks whether he has
generated secret keys for identities ID and ID . If
he has not generated secret keys for ID and ID ,
B checks whether R(ID) = 1 and R(ID) = 1.
a) If those hold, he computes KID
=
(KID,1 , KID,2 , KID,3 )
and
KID
=
(KID ,1 , KID ,2 , KID ,3 ). Then, he can compute
an access permission (the re-encryption key)
R
as follows. B chooses t, β, ρ ← Zp , and
computes

t
KID
 ,1 = KID  ,1 h ,

(4)

t

Γ=g,
D1 =

KID,1
· (u0

ρ
KID
 ,1 Γ

(5)
ui )β
ui ))β .

D2 = e(C2 , (u0

(6)

i∈I 

(7)

i∈I 

and

D3 = gρ .

(8)

B sends (D1 , D2 , D3 , KID,2 ) to the adversary
A.
b) Otherwise, B aborts the simulation and outputs his guess μ randomly.
Re-encryption
Query. The adversary can
query re-encryption on (ID, ID , C). B check
whether he has generated an access permission
(D1 , , D2 , D3 , KID,2 )) from identities ID to identity
ID . If he has not generated an access permission
from ID to ID , he generated (D1 , , D2 , D3 , KID,2 ))
as above. Otherwise, B can compute

1) Secret key Query. The adversary A cannot query
secret key for ID∗ .
2) Permission Query. The adversary A cannot query
permission on (ID∗ , ID, C2∗ ) and secret key for ID.
3) Re-encryption Query. The adversary A cannot
query re-encryption on (ID∗ , ID, C ∗ ), permission
on (ID∗ , ID, C2∗ ) and secret key for ID.
Guess. The adversary A outputs his guess ω  on ω. If
ω  = ω, B outputs μ = 0. If, ω  = ω, B outputs μ = 1.
As shown above, the public parameters and the secret
keys created in the simulation paradigm are identical to
those created in the real protocol. The algorithm B does
not abort the simulation if and only if the secret keys
can be generated correctly and R(ID∗ ) = 0. In q1 secret
key queries, q2 permission queries and q3 re-encryption
queries, B needs to create at most q1 + 2q2 + 2q3 secret
keys. Thereafter, from Theorem 1, the advantage with
which B can break the DBDH assumption is at least
()
32(q1 +2q2 +2q3 )(n+1) .
We demonstrate the computation cost and communication cost of our IBSDDS I scheme in Table 1 and Table
2, where by E and P , we denote the running time of
executing one exponential and one paring, respectively.
By EG and EGτ , we denote the length of one element
in the group G and Gτ , respectively. By P KG, U , P S,
O and R, we denote the private key generator, the
user, the proxy server, the data owner and the receiver,
respectively. We compare the properties of the related
schemes in Table 3.

4 I DENTITY - BASED
DATA S TORAGE II

S ECURE

D ISTRIBUTED

Challenge. The adversary A submits an identity ID∗ and
two messages M0 and M1 with the equal length. The
?
algorithm B checks R(ID∗ ) = 0.

In some complex network environments, such as cloud
computing and distributed systems, CPA security cannot
satisfy the application requirement. Therefore, identitybased distributed data storage scheme with strong security (CCA) is desirable. In this section, we propose a
CCA-2 secure identity-based secure distributed storage
II (IBSDDS II) scheme by introducing an existentially
unforgeable one-time signature scheme to the IBSDDS
I scheme. This idea is from [45]. Our IBSDDS II scheme
is demonstrated in Fig.3.

1) If R(ID∗ ) = 1, B aborts and outputs his guess μ
randomly.

Correctness. This is the same as in the scheme IBSDDS
I.

2) If R(ID∗ ) = 0, B ﬂips an unbiased coin with
{0, 1} and obtains ω ∈ {0, 1}. The challenger computes C1∗ = Mω · Z, C2∗ = C = g c and C3∗ =

Theorem 4. Our identity-based secure distributed
data storage scheme II (IBSDDS II) scheme is (T, q1 ,
q2 , q3 , q4 , q5 , ())-secure against chose ciphertext attacks

C1 = D2 · C1 , C2 = C2 , C3 = C3 ,
C4 = D1 , C5 = D3 and C6 = KID,2 .
B responds with the re-encrypted ciphertext C  =
(C1 , C2 , C3 , C4 , C5 , C6 ).
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TABLE 1: The Computation cost of Our IBSDDS I Scheme
Scheme

Setup
3E

IBSDDS I

KeyGen
4E+5P

Encryption
3E+2P

Computation Cost
Permission
Re-encryption
3E+5P
0

Query
2E

O Decryption
2P

R Decryption
E+2P

TABLE 2: The Communication cost of Our IBSDDS I Scheme
Scheme
IBSDDS I

Encryption
O → PS
2EG + EGτ

KeyGen
P KG → U
3EG

Communication Cost
Query
Permission
R → PS
PS → O
O → PS
3EG
4EG
3EG + EGτ

O Decryption
PS → O
2EG + EGτ

R Decryption
PS → R
5EG + EGτ

TABLE 3: Property Comparison of related Schemes
Property
Unidirectional
Noninteractive
Key optimal
Collusion-safe
Nontransitive
File-based access

Matsuo [41]
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

WWMO [42]
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

WWMO [43]
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

(CCA) if the one-time signature scheme is (T  , 1,  ())existentially unforgeable and the (T  ,  ()) decisional
bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman (DBDH) assumption holds in the
bilinear group (e, p, G, Gτ ) where
T  = T + T  + O(T + T  )
and
() =  () + 32(q1 + 2q2 + 2q3 + q4 + 2q5 )(n + 1) ()
Proof: Suppose that there exists an adversary A that
can break the CCA security of our IBSDDS II scheme
with advantage AdvA >  () + 32(q1 + 2q2 + 2q3 +
q4 + 2q5 )(n + 1) (), we can construct an algorithm
B that can use A to forge a signature or break the
DBDH assumption as follows. The challenger generates
the bilinear group GG(1 ) → (e, p, G, Gτ ) and chooses a
R
generator g ← G. It ﬂips an unbiased coin μ with {0, 1}.
If μ = 0, he sends (A, B, C, Z) = (g a , g b , bc , e(g, g)abc ) to
B. Otherwise, he sends (A, B, C, Z) = (g a , g b , g c , e(g, g)z )
R
to B, where z ← Zp . The algorithm B will outputs his

guess μ on μ.
Setup. The algorithm B sets σ = 4(q1 +2q2 +2q3 +q4 +2q5 )
R
and chooses an integer ν ← [n]. It uniformly selects
two integrity vectors Π = {π1 , π2 , · · · , πn } and Φ =
R
R
{φ1 , φ2 , · · · , φn }, where πi ← [σ − 1] and φi ← Zp for
R
R
i = 1, 2, · · · , n. It choose π0 ← [σ − 1] and φ0 ← Zp . Then,
the algorithm B deﬁnes three functions:
P (ID) = (p − σν) + π0 +

πi ,
i∈I

Q(ID) = φ0 +

φi
i∈I

and
R(ID) =

0,

if π0 +

i∈I

πi ≡ 0 (mod σ)

1,

if π0 +

i∈I πi ≡ 0 (mod σ)

GA [38]
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No

CT [39]
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No

THJ [40]
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No

Our Scheme
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

B sets g1 = A, η = B, g = g θ , g2 = Aθ ,
R
u0 = η p−σν+π0 g φ0 and ui = η πi g φi , where θ ← Zp .
R
It chooses h ← G and an one-time signature scheme
SG(1 ) → (SKeyGen, Sign, Verify). The public parameters are (e, p, G, Gτ , g, h, η, g, h, u0 , g1 , g2 , U, Sign, Verify)
and the master secret key is η a = g ab . The distribution of
these parameters is identical to those in the real protocol.
Phase 1.
1) Secret Key Query. A can query secret key for an
?
identity ID. B checks R(ID) = 1. If R(ID) = 0,
B aborts the simulation and outputs his guess μ
randomly. If R(ID) = 1, B generates a secret key
for ID using (1), (2) and (3). B responds A with
SKID = (KID,1 , KID,2 , KID,3 ).
2) Permission Query. A can query permission on
(ID, ID , C2 ). B checks whether R(ID) = 1 and
R(ID ) = 1.
a) If those hold, B computes an access permission using (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8). B responds
A with (D1 , D2 , D3 , KID,2 ).
b) Otherwise, B aborts the simulation and outputs his guess μ randomly.
3) Re-encryption Query. The adversary A can query
on (ID, ID , CT ), where CT = (C1 , C2 , C3 , C4 ,
σ, vk). B check whether he has created an access permission for (ID, ID , C2 ). If he has not
created an access permission, he create an access
permission as above to obtain (D1 , D2 , D3 , KID,2 )
and computes C1 = D2 · C1 , C2 = C2 , C3 =
C3 , C4 = C4 , C5 = D1 , C6 = D3 , C7 =
D3 , σ  = σ, vk  = vk. B responds with CT  =
(C1 , C2 , C3 , C4 , C5 , C6 , C7 , σ  , vk  ).
4) Owner Decryption Query. The adversary A can
query owner decryption on (ID, CT ), where CT =
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Setup. This algorithm takes as input the security parameter 1 , and outputs a bilinear group GG(1 ) →
R
(e, p, G, Gτ ) with prime order p, where e : G × G → Gτ . Let g, h, η, g and h be the generators of G, u0 ← G
R
R
and U = (u1 , u2 , · · · , un ) where ui ← G for i = 1, 2, · · · , n. It chooses α ← Zp and sets g1 = g α and g2 = gα .

It generates an one-time signature scheme SG(1 ) → (SKeyGen, Sign, Verify), where SKeyGen(1 ) → (sk, vk). Let
H : vk → Zp be a hash function. The public parameters are (e, p, G, Gτ , g, h, η, g, h, u0 , g1 , g2 , U, H, Sign, Verify)
and the master secret keys is η α .
KeyGen. Let ID denote an identity which is an n bit string, IDi be the ith bit of ID and I be the set which
consists of all the index i with IDi = 1. This algorithm takes as input the master secret key η α and the user’s
identity ID, and computes
KID,1 = η α (u0

ui )rID , KID,2 = g rID and KID,3 = grID .
i∈I

The secret key for the user is SKID = (KID,1 , KID,2 , KID,3 ). This secret key can be veriﬁed by
?

?

e(KID,1 , g) = e(η, g1 ) · e((u0

ui ), KID,2 ) and e(KID,2 , g) = e(g, KID,3 ).
i∈I

Encryption. Suppose that there are k messages Mi ∈ {M1 , M2 , · · · , Mk }. To encrypt Mi , the owner runs
R
SKeyGen(1 ) → (sk, vk), chooses si ← Zp and computes
Ci,1 = Mi · e(g1 , η)si , Ci,2 = g si , Ci,3 = (u0

ui )si , Ci,4 = (g H(vk) g)si
i∈I

and

σi = Sign(sk, Ci,2 , Ci,3 , Ci,4 )

for i = 1, 2, · · · , k. The ciphertext for the message Mi is CTi = (Ci,1 , Ci,2 , Ci,3 , Ci,4 , σi , vk). the owner sends
{CT1 , CT2 , · · · , CTk } to the proxy servers. The proxy servers validate the ciphertexts by checking
?

?

?

ui ), Ci,2 ) = e(Ci,3 , g) and e(g, Ci,4 ) = e(Ci,2 , (g H(vk) g))

σi = Verify(vk, Ci,2 , Ci,3 , Ci,4 ), e((u0
i∈I

for i = 1, 2, · · · , k. If the equations hold, the proxy servers store the ciphertext CTi = (Ci,1 , Ci,2 , Ci,3 , Ci,4 , σi , vk)
for the owner. Otherwise, the proxy servers reject the ciphtertext.
R

Query. If a receiver with identity ID wants to access the message CTi , he chooses t ← Zp , and computes

t

KID
and Γ = gt . He sends (ID , KID
 ,1 = KID  ,1 h
 ,1 , KID  ,3 , Γ) to the proxy server. Then, the proxy server


redirects (ID , KID
,
K
,
Γ,
C
)
to
the
owner.
 ,1
ID ,3
i,2
Permission. The owner checks whether the receiver has been veriﬁed by the PKG by
?


e(KID
 ,1 , g) = e(η, g2 ) · e((u0

ui ), KID ,3 ) · e(h, Γ).
i∈I 

R

If it holds, the owner chooses β, ρ ← Zp and computes
D1 =

KID,1
· (u0

ρ
KID
 ,1 · Γ

ui )β , D2 = e(Ci,2 , (u0
i∈I 

ui ))β and D3 = gρ .
i∈I 

The owner sends (D1 , D2 , D3 , KID,2 ) to the proxy server, where (D1 , D2 , D3 , KID,2 ) is a re-encryption key.
Re-encryption. Receiving (D1 , D2 , D3 , KID,2 ) from the owner, the proxy server computes the re-encrypted
ciphterxt as







Ci,1
= D2 · Ci,1 , Ci,2
= Ci,2 , Ci,3
= Ci,3 , Ci,4
= Ci,4 , Ci,5
= D1 , Ci,6
= D3 , Ci,7
= KID,2 and σi = σi .







The proxy server responds the receiver with CTi = (Ci,1
, Ci,2
, Ci,3
, Ci,4
, Ci,5
, Ci,6
, Ci,7
, σi , vk).
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Decryption.
?

1) To decrypt the ciphertext CTi = (Ci,1 , Ci,2 , Ci,3 , σi , vk), the owner O checks σi = Verify(vk, Ci,2 , Ci,3 , Ci,4 )
and computes
e(KID,2 , Ci,3 )
Mi = Ci,1 ·
.
e(KID,1 , Ci,2 )
?







, Ci,2
, Ci,3
, Ci,5
, Ci,6
, Ci,7
, σi , vk), the receiver R checks σi =
2) To decrypt the ciphertext CTi = (Ci,1





t

Verify(vk, Ci,2 , Ci,3 , Ci,4 ) and computes K1 = KID ,1 · Ci,6 · Ci,5 . Then, he can compute

Mi = Ci,1
·



, Ci,3
)
e(Ci,7
.

e(K1 , Ci,2 )

Fig. 3: Identity-Based Distributed Data Storage II
(C1 , C2 , C3 , C4 , σ, vk) is a ciphertext for the identity
?
ID. B check R(ID) = 0.
a) If R(ID) = 0, B aborts and outputs his guess
μ randomly.
?

b) If R(ID) = 0, B check the signature σ =
Verify(vk, C2 , C3 , C4 ). If the equation holds, B
generates a secret key KID for ID as above
e(K
,C3 )
.
and responds with C1 · e(KID,2
ID,1 ,C2 )
5) Receiver Decryption Query. The adversary A can
query receiver decryption on (ID, ID , CT ). B
checks whether he has created secret keys for ID
and ID , an access permission for (ID, ID , C2 )
and a re-encryption ciphertext CT  . If he has not
done these, he creates secret keys, an access permission and a re-encryption as in the secret key
query, permission query and re-encryption query
to obtain (SKID , SKID ), (D1 , D2 , D3 , KID,2 ) and
CT  . Then, B computes K1 as above and responds
e(C  ,C )
with C1 · e(K71 ,C3 ) .
2

Challenge. The adversary A submits an identity ID∗
and two messages M0 and M1 with the equal length.
?
B checks R(ID) = 0.
1) If R(ID) = 1, B aborts and outputs his guess μ
randomly.
2) If R(ID) = 0, B ﬂips an unbiased coin with
{0, 1} and obtains ω ∈ {0, 1}. The challenger runs
SKeyGen(1 ) → (sk ∗ , vk ∗ ) and computes C1∗ = Mω ·
∗
Z, C2∗ = C = g c , C3∗ = C Q(ID ) = (u0 i∈I ∗ ui )c ,
∗
C4∗ = C H(vk )+θ and σ ∗ = Sign(sk ∗ , C2∗ , C3∗ , C4∗ ).
B sends the ciphertext CT ∗ = (C1∗ , C2∗ , C3∗ , C4∗ ,
σ ∗ , vk ∗ ) to A.
Phase 2. Phase 1. is repeated with the following restricts.
1) Secret key Query. The adversary A cannot query
secret key for ID∗ .
2) Permission Query. The adversary A cannot query
permission on (ID∗ , ID, C2∗ ) and secret key for ID.

3) Re-encryption Query. The adversary A cannot
query re-encryption on (ID∗ , ID, CT ∗ ), permission
on (ID∗ , ID, C2 ) and secret key for ID.
4) Owner Decryption Query. The adversary A cannot query the owner decryption algorithm on
(ID∗ , CT ∗ ).
5) Receiver Decryption Query. The adversary A cannot query re-encryption on (ID∗ , ID, CT ∗ ) and the
˜ ∗ ), where
receiver decryption algorithm on (ID, CT
∗
˜ is the re-encrypted ciphertext of CT ∗ .
CT
Guess. The adversary A outputs his guess ω  on ω. If
ω  = ω, B outputs μ = 0. If, ω  = ω, B outputs μ = 1.
As shown above, the public parameters and the secret
keys created in the simulation paradigm are identical to
those created in the real protocol. The algorithm B does
not abort the simulation if and only if the secret keys can
be generated correctly, R(ID∗ ) = 0 and the signatures
in the ciphertext are valid. In q1 secret key queries, q2
permission queries, q3 re-encryption queries, q4 owner
decryption queries and q5 receiver decryption queries, B
needs to create at most q1 + 2q2 + 2q3 + q4 + 2q5 secret
keys.
Now, we bound the probability with which B can
break the DBDH assumption. This bound is computed
using the method in [46]. If μ = 1, A cannot obtain
anything about ω. Hence, A can output ω  = ω with no
advantage, namely, Pr[ω  = ω|μ = 1] = 12 . Since B outputs μ = 1 when ω  = ω, we have Pr[μ = μ|μ = 1] = 12 .
If μ = 0, A can output ω  = ω with the advantage at least
(), namely Pr[ω  = ω|μ = 0] ≥ 12 + (). If B outputs
μ = 0 when ω  = ω, we have
Pr[μ = μ|μ = 0] −

1
2

≥

AdvA − Pr[abort]

≥

32(q1 + 2q2 + 2q3 + q4 + 2q5 )
(n + 1) () +  () − Pr[abort]

where Pr[abort] is the probability with which B aborts
the simulation. The ﬁrst inequality is from the case
Z = e(g, g)abc , so the simulation is performed correctly
if B does not abort. Hence, B can solve the DBDH
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assumption with the advantage at least

[5]

()
≥  ().
32(q1 + 2q2 + 2q3 + q4 + 2q5 )(n + 1)
It remains to bound the probability with which B
aborts the simulation as a result of A’s decryption
queries. We claim that Pr[abort] <  (). Otherwise, a
forged signature can be computed with advantage at
least  (). Brieﬂy, receiving the challenged signature key
sk ∗ in the simulation, A causes an abort by submitting
a decryption query which includes a forged signature
of one ciphertext under sk ∗ . Therefore, B can use the
forged signature to break the existential unforgability of
the one-time signature. Notably, A can only query one
signature for the challenged ciphertext. Hence, we have
Pr[abort] <  ().
So, B can break the decisional bilinear DifﬁeHellman assumption with advantage more than
()
32(q1 +2q2 +2q3 +q4 +2q5 )(n+1) . This ﬁnishes our proof.

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

[11]

5

C ONCLUSION

Distributed data storage schemes provide the users with
convenience to outsource their ﬁles to untrusted proxy
servers. Identity-based secure distributed data storage
(IBSDDS) schemes are a special kind of distributed data
storage schemes where users are identiﬁed by their identities and can communicate without the need of verifying
the public key certiﬁcates. In this paper, we proposed
two new IBSDDS schemes in standard model where, for
one query, the receiver can only access one ﬁle, instead
of all ﬁles. Furthermore, the access permission can be
made by the owner, instead of the trusted party. Notably,
our schemes are secure against the collusion attacks. The
ﬁrst scheme is CPA secure, while the second one is CCA
secure.
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